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Abstract
We reexamine the empirical relevance of habit formation preferences with micro-
data on households' portfolio choices. We rst derive the analytical solution to the risky
asset share in a theoretical model with both habits and time-varying labor income. Our
analytical results indicate that (1) for each household, there are two channels through
which the risky asset share responds to wealth uctuations, habits and household
income; (2) across households, there are heterogenous responses through the habit
channel: those who experience large negative income shocks reduce their share of risky
assets; and (3) two potential mis-identication problems arise when both two channels
and the heterogeneity are ignored. Contrary to the existing literature, our empirical
results nd positive evidence of habit formation preferences after correcting the two
mis-identication problems.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic models with habit formation preferences have been used to explain a variety
of dynamic asset pricing phenomena and macroeconomic facts, such as the equity premium
puzzle [see, Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Boldrin et al. (2001), and others], the excess
sensitivity of consumption to income [see, for example, Boldrin et al. (2001)], the equity home
bias [see, among others, Shore and White (2002)], the hump-shaped response of aggregate
variables to monetary shocks [Fuhrer (2000), Uribe (2002), Christiano et al. (2005)], and
countercyclical markups [Ravn et al. (2006)]. Despite the mounting literature that uses
habit formation, there are only a few papers that test the existence of habit formation from
Micro-data.
The existing studies that test key theoretical implications from theoretical models with
habits using Micro-data, nd mixed evidence of habit formation preferences. For example,
Dynan (2000) rejects habit preference using US consumption data. On the contrary, Ravina
(2007) provides evidence of habit persistence in household consumption choices using a panel
data of U.S. credit-card account holders. Carrasco et al. (2007) estimate the intra-temporal
marginal rate of substitution using Spanish consumption panel data and nd strong support
of habit. Recently, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) investigate how households portfolio
allocations change in response to wealth uctuations and nd negative evidence of habits.
In this paper, we reexamine predictions of habit formation preferences on households'
portfolio choices with the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data. We rst build a
discrete-time model of portfolio choice with habit and time-varying income from sources other
than wealth (hereafter household labor income). Our emphasis on time-varying household
income is simply motivated by the empirical facts of the PSID data. (1) All households
in the PSID data received labor income. And (2) a large portion of households in the
PSID data experienced large negative income shocks. For example, about 30% households
received income below 30% of their average income over time. Our theoretical model extends
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and considers the impact of time-varying household income
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on portfolio choice.
We derive the analytical solution to the risky asset share in our portfolio choice model
with both time-varying household income and habits. Our close-form solution suggests
that for each household, its risky asset share responds to wealth uctuations through two
channels: the habit channel and the household income channel. Under normal circumstances
(for example, the household in our model does not experience large negative income shocks),
the share will go up due to the existence of habits and go down in the presence of household
income. Thus, a mis-identication problem may arise when the response due to both habits
and household income is ascribed to the response due to habits. We call this an internal mis-
identication problem. The second bias arises due to the heterogeneity in households' income
shocks. Specically, households with large negative income shocks are likely to decrease
their risky asset shares responding to wealth accumulations in the habit channel, while
households without large negative income shocks will increase their risky asset shares when
they become richer. Thus, habit formation preferences imply opposite relative risky aversion
predictions across households. As a result, an external mis-identication problem may arise
when estimating over samples in which heterogenous households are pooled together.
To facilitate the discussion, we dene three dierent forms of habit formation preference
implications (hereafter HFPI): the strong form, the semi-strong form, and the weak form.1 If
the portfolio choice model with habits considers neither the aforementioned two channels for
each household, nor the aforementioned heterogeneous responses through the habit channel
across households, we label the key theoretical implication from such a model as the strong
form of HFPI. The strong form implies that households will, unconditionally, increase their
risky asset shares when their wealth increases, as is discussed in Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2008). If the portfolio choice model with habits does consider the two channels but ignores
the heterogeneity, we label the key theoretical implication from such a model as the semi-
strong form of HFPI. The semi-form implies that after controlling for the impact of household
1When a model imposes less restrictions, we say the derived theoretical implication is stronger.
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income, the response through the habit channel should be positive. At last, if the portfolio
choice model with habits considers both the two channels and heterogeneity, we label the key
theoretical implication from such a model as the weak form of HFPI. The weak-form implies
that after controlling for the impact of household income and the impact of large negative
income shocks, the response through the habit channel in the group in which households
experienced large negative income shocks should be lower than that in the group in which
households did not experience large negative income shocks.
We then empirically test the semi-strong form and the weak form of HFPI and compare
the results with the strong form tested in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). We nd positive
evidence of the weak-form of HFPI and no evidence of the semi-form of HFPI. First, if the
identication scheme builds on a model that does consider the two channels but ignores the
heterogeneity so that the test corrects the internal but not the external mis-identication
problem, our estimates are statistically insignicant. This contrasts strongly to Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2008), who test the strong-form of HFPI and nd negative responses. This
comparison is in line with our theory, which states that controlling the impact of household
income will increase the response. Second, if the identication scheme builds on a model
that considers both the two channels and the heterogeneity so that the test corrects both the
internal and the external mis-identication problems, our estimates are both economically
and statistically signicant, a nding which is clear evidence of habit formation preferences.
In summary, our empirical results highlight the importance of incorporating time-varying
income in a portfolio choice model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and provides
testable implications. Section 3 briey explains the data, variables and the sample selection.
Section 4 presents the results on weak form of HFPI and Section 5 shows the results on
semi-strong Form of HFPI. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Model and Testable Implications
The theoretical model is a highly stylized portfolio choice model with a time-varying house-
hold income ow and constant external habits. We consider the model for several reasons.
First, it captures the realistic feature that the majority of the US households do receive
time-varying household income. Second, the majority of modern macroeconomics models,
if they assume habit formation preferences, contain these two elements. Third, the model
delivers clear testable predictions on the targeted relationship between risky asset shares and
wealth uctuations.
2.1 The Model
In this economy, the household inherits wealth, Wt, from the last period, receives household
income, Yt, in the current period, and chooses consumption Ct and the share of wealth
Wt   Ct + Yt invested in the risky asset, t, to maximize
U = E
1X
t=0
t
(Ct  X)1 
1   ;
where E denotes the unconditional expectation operator and  denotes the subjective dis-
count factor. X denotes the external habit.2 The household receives time-varying household
income in our model. This is dierent from Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) in which there is
no household income. To facilitate the discussion (in order to obtain the analytical solution),
we impose the following restriction on household income:
(Yt+1   Y ) =  (Yt   Y ) + t+1;
2In the appendix, we show that under normal circumstances, time-varying external habits do not bring
much additional insight about how habit formation preferences aect the relationship between risky asset
shares and wealth uctuations. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) show the similar conclusion in their appendix.
For this very reason, we assume constant, instead of time-varying, external habits.
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where Y denotes the steady state of household income.  is a parameter whose value is within
( 1; 1). The innovation term, , follows identical and independent normal distributions.
Our specication may be restrictive in the sense that we assume an AR(1) process of Yt.
Nevertheless, such a process enables us, when there is no uncertainty, to derive a close-form
solution, which will deliver clear theoretical predictions.
The household can invest in two securities: a risky asset with return Rt and a risk-free
asset with return Rf . As a result, the household's wealth in the beginning of period t+ 1 is
given by
Wt+1 = (1 +Rp;t+1) (Wt + Yt   Ct) ; (2.1)
where Rp;t+1 = t (Rt  Rf ) +Rf denotes the return to the household's wealth portfolio.
Under the condition that expected return and the standard deviation are constant and
there are no income shocks, i.e., t  0, the solution to t is given by:
t = 
241  X   Y
Wt   Ct + Yt + Yt YZ+Rf

Rf
351 + Yt   Y
(Wt   Ct + Yt) (Z +Rf )

; (2.2)
where Z = 1 

(1 + Rf ), and  denotes the solution of the risky asset share in the portfolio
choice problem in Samuelson (1969). The derivation is in the appendix. Eq. (2.2) provides
an analytical solution that enables us to discuss how the risky asset share responds to post
consumption wealth and how household time-varying income and habits aect the response.
Next, we discuss the role of household time-varying income and habits on the response of
risky share to wealth shock.
2.2 Two Channels and An Internal Mis-identication Problem
For each household, its risky asset share responds to its wealth accumulation through
two channels, the habit channel and the household income channel. The internal mis-
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identication problem arises when the response through two channels is ascribed as the
response through the habit channel. To see this, we set Yt  Y and Eq. (2.2) reduces to:
t = 

1  X
(Wt   Ct + Y )Rf

| {z }
The habit channel:+
+

Y
(Wt   Ct + Y )Rf

| {z }
The income channel: 
: (2.3)
The sign \+" (\-") means that the risky asset share will increase (decrease) when the post-
consumption wealth increases. It is clear that t respond to the change of Wt   Ct in
two channels: the habit channel (\+") and the income channel (\-"). One thing worth
mentioning is even though t is decreasing in post consumption wealth through the second
channel, @t=@Y is still positive: the higher household income the household has, the larger
the  will be. In addition, even though adding a constant stream of household income
in case of a constant habit is mathematically isomorphic (in terms of the asset allocation
implications) to just reducing the habit by a constant, these are two quite dierent concepts
and more importantly, ignoring the impact of household income will bias down the estimation
of habit formation.
From Eq. (2.3), we obtain the following core regression equation:
t  (  Y )wt + "t; (2.4)
where  denotes the rst-order dierence, wt  log (Wt   Ct), and "t follows identical,
independent, normal distribution and is uncorrelated with wt.
3  is the parameter that
catches the response of risky asset shares to wealth uctuations through the habit channel.
In the case of Yt  Y , we conclude that X > 0 implies that  > 0. That is to say, a positive
estimate of  suggests that habit formation preferences are in line with portfolio choice data.
As is explained in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), an increase in wealth, for example, should
lead to a temporary decrease in relative risk aversion and an increase of the risky asset share
3The derivation of Eq. (2.4) is in the appendix.
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if households have habit formation preferences. We conclude  > 0 because the response
through the income channel is negative.
If our model with a constant household income ow is correctly specied, the estimate
whose identication builds on a theoretical model without considering a constant house-
hold income is mis-identied. In the latter model, the core regression equation and the
corresponding OLS estimate are given by:
t  wt + "t; (2.5)
~ =

(wt)
0 (wt)
 1
(wt)
0 (t) :
However, if Eq. (2.4) is correctly specied, we will have:
E (~) =

(wt)
0 (wt)
 1
(wt)
0 (  Y )wt =   Y  : (2.6)
The mis-identication problem arises when the estimate of (  Y ) is ascribed to be the
estimate of . From Eq. (2.6), if household income has a strong impact, i.e., Y is large, ~,
may be close to zero or negative even though the true value of  is still positive. In other
words, ~ being close to zero or negative does not necessarily imply that micro-data does not
support the existence of habit formation preferences, because it does not necessarily mean
that  is negative or zero.
2.3 Heterogenous Responses and An External Mis-identication
Problem
Households are heterogenous in terms of the responses of their risky asset shares to wealth
uctuations through the habit channel. When households do not have large negative income
shocks, they increase their risky asset shares as the optimal response to wealth accumulations
through the habit channel. However, when households have large negative income shocks,
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they may decrease their risky asset shares as the optimal response to wealth accumulations
through the habit channel. To see the heterogenous responses, note that when Y is time-
varying, the solution to t through the habit channel is given by

241  X
Wt   Ct + Yt + Yt YZ+Rf

Rf
351 + Yt   Y
(Wt   Ct + Yt) (Z +Rf )

| {z }
The habit channel
: (2.7)
Eq. (2.7) shows that if Yt is far below Y , i.e., a large negative income shock, the response
through the habit channel can be negative. Note that if Yt is a quite persistent process,
for example,  = 0:95, the value of Z is about 0.05. In this example, it is likely that the
sum in the second parenthesis in the expression (2.7) becomes negative. In other words,
the conventional wisdom, that risky asset shares are increasing in wealth through the habit
channel, may break down in the presence of large negative income shocks.
Thus, there are two groups of households. Households in the rst group have large
negative income shocks and respond negatively to wealth accumulations through the habit
channel. Households in the second group do not have large negative income shocks and they
may respond positively. If we run regressions with a sample that pools the two dierent
groups together, the associated estimate is mis-identied and it is likely to be insignicant.
We label this mis-identication problem as the external mis-identication problem.
2.4 Testable Predictions
We have shown that incorporating realistic feature of time-varying household income matters
in terms of identication. We now derive empirical tests of the relevance of habit formation
preferences by controlling the impact of constant household income and/or income shocks,
i.e., testing the weak form and the semi-strong form of HFPI.
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2.4.1 Weak Form of HFPI
Given the aforementioned internal and external mis-identication problems, we design the
following test to examine the weak form of HFPI. We divide households in each subsample
into two groups: households in the rst group experienced large negative income shocks and
households in the second group did not experience large negative income shocks. Second,
for each group, we obtain an estimate of i; i = 1; 2 from equation (2.4). Third, our testable
hypothesis for habit formation preference is,
2 > 1: (2.8)
Thus, instead of testing whether  > 0 with the pooled subsamples as in Brunnermeier and
Nagel (2008), we test the dierence of 's across groups.
2.4.2 Semi-strong Form of HFPI
Given the aforementioned internal mis-identication problem, we run regression to obtain the
estimates of the response through the habit channel, . We consider the following testable
hypothesis to test the semi-strong form of HFPI:
 > 0; (2.9)
This is the same as in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). One way to understand Inequality
(2.9) is: when household income is no (or small), i.e., Y = 0 (Y  0), the partial derivative
of t with respect to wt is positive.
3 Variables, Data, and Sample Selection
Here we give a brief introduction about variables, data, and sampling. We follow closely
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). Risk-free assets are dened as the sum of cash-like assets
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and holdings of bonds. Liquid assets are given by the sum of risk-free assets and the holdings
of stocks and mutual funds. Subtracting other liabilities from liquid assets yields liquid
wealth. Financial wealth are the sum of liquid wealth, equity in a private business, and
home equity. We consider three dierent risky asset shares: the sum of the holdings of
stocks and mutual funds divided by liquid wealth, the holdings of risky assets divided by
nancial wealth, and the sum of the holdings of stocks, mutual funds, and the equity in a
private business divided by the dierence between nancial wealth and home equity.
The PSID panel data record many household characteristics annually after 1997 and
households' asset holdings in years 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, and 2003. Thus, time-
series data about asset holdings are either 2-year apart or 5-year apart. Hence, we divide
the data into two subsamples: the 1984-1999 (k = 5) subsample and the 1999-2003 (k = 2)
subsample. We select households who hold at least $10,000 liquid wealth or at least $10,000
nancial wealth in the last period, t  k. In addition, we require that the martial status of
the family unit head remained unchanged from t  k to t and that no assets were moved in
or out as a consequence of a family member moving into or out of family unit.
4 Empirical Results about Weak Form of HFPI
To test our hypothesis, Inequality (2.8), we divide the subsample into two groups. In the
rst group, i = 1, households' current income is below a threshold ratio of their time-series
averages. The rest enters the second group, i = 2. In the benchmark exercise, we set the
threshold ratio at 30%. In the sensitivity analysis, we change the ratio from 20% to 50%.
For each group, we estimate the following equation :
kt = 
iqit k + kh
i
t + 
ikw
i
t   #yitk
 
wit

+ "it; i = 1; 2: (4.1)
qit k is a vector of household characteristics and the xed time eects for the i   th group.
For example, it includes a broad range of variables related to the life cycle, background, and
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nancial situation of the household. The vector kh
i
t contains variables that capture major
changes in household characteristic or asset ownership for the i  th group. For example, it
includes: changes in family size, changes in the number of children, and sets of dummies for
house ownership, business ownership, and nonzero labor income at t and t k.4 The inclusion
of these additional variables serves the purpose of controlling some important econometric
issues, such as life-cycle eects and preference shifters, and idiosyncratic versus aggregate
wealth changes.
Finally, yt = log(Yt). In our empirical analysis of liquid risky asset shares, we use two
dierent types of household income: the rst is the total income which includes the income
from liquid wealth; and the second is labor income. Note that, neither of the two is right
household income which is corresponding to liquid wealth. We use the aforementioned two
because we do not have the data for the right household income in line with liquid wealth.
In our empirical analysis of nancial risky asset shares, household income refers to labor
income.
It is worth mentioning that Eq. (4.1) is not exactly in line with the theoretical model
because  depends on yt in the theoretical model and it is not a function of yt in the regression
equation. Here we take three steps to show the link between our estimate from Eq. (4.1)
and the  in Eq. (2.4). To save notations, we drop the superscript i in the discussion below.
First, from Eq. (2.3), we have:
@t
@wt

Y=1
=   W
(W + 1)2Rf
:
where W denotes the average of wealth. Second, from Eq. (5.1), we have:
@^t
@wt

yt=0
= ^  #^@ytwt
@wt

yt=0
= ^  #^@ytwt
@wt

yt=0
= ^:
4In particular, asset composition controls for the liquid asset share include: the labor income/liquid wealth
ratio interacted with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio.
For the nancial asset share, asset composition controls consist only of the labor income/nancial wealth
ratio interacted with age.
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where ^ is the estimate from our regression equation. Last, it immediately follows that
our estimate, ^, slightly underestimates  with the dierence of e
w
(ew+1)2Rf
. With the data
moments, we have the following:
 = ^+
W
(W + 1)2Rf
= ^: (4.2)
To see that the approximation holds, we check the average of wealth. In this paper, we
have two types of wealth, liquid wealth and nancial wealth. In the 1984-1999 subsample,
the average of liquid wealth of stock market participants is $269; 609 and the average of
nancial wealth of stock market participants is $630; 488. In the 1999-2003 subsample, they
are $294; 622 and $640; 382, respectively. With any one of these averages, the dierence is
close to zero given that annual risky free rates are around 3% in the periods covered by our
two subsamples. The same conclusion holds for each group in each subsample.
The main results about weak form of HFPI are in Table 1. To facilitate comparison, we
present the test results about the strong form of HFPI in Table 3 in which we replicate those
in Tables 4 and 5 in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). Our results about the stock market
participation and instrumental variables are close to those in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)
thus we do not report the corresponding results. Instead, we focus on reporting results on
the response of risky shares to wealth uctuations which is corresponding to Tables 4 and 5
in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008).
With the OLS estimates, the response of risky asset shares to wealth uctuations in the
rst group is smaller than the response in the second group and the dierence is statistically
signicant. For example, the dierence between  across groups could be 0.3 percentage
points if we use liquid risky asset shares. This number seems arguably economic signicant.
This nding provides positive evidence of habit formation preferences in the households'
portfolio choice data. Even though the 2SLS estimates are not statistically signicant, they
clearly imply a positive movement of 's from the i = 1 group to the i = 2 group. This
is also in line with our hypothesis. The major reason for the insignicant 2SLS regression
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results is that the instruments we chose are weak instruments. That is a limitation, as
we have not been able to nd good instruments. One thing worth mentioning is that our
practice of using labor income to denote the income from sources other than liquid wealth
seems to be problematic. For this purpose, we also use the household income to denote the
income from sources other than liquid wealth. The results are both statistically signicant
and economically signicant, see Table 1.
The strong positive evidence comes from our results associated nancial risky asset shares.
In that case, we obtain the similar results but a larger dierence between 's across groups.
In particular, the dierence increases from 0.3 percentage points to at least 0.68 percentage
points, which is undoubtedly economic signicant. Our regression results with nancial risky
asset shares provide stronger positive evidence of habit formation preferences in the PSID
data. One concern about the results associated with the nancial risky asset shares is the
inclusion of home equity because some argue that the behavior of home equity may be quite
dierent from other risky assets. To check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of
home equity, we construct the third risky asset share by taking away home equity from both
the nominator and denominator of the nancial risky asset share. In that case, we obtain
even stronger positive evidence of habit formation preferences in the PSID data.
In our sensitivity analysis, we change the 30% threshold value from 20% to 50% and we
obtain the similar positive evidence of habit formation preferences, see Fig. 1. Panel (a)
denotes the results associated with liquid risky asset share. And Panel (b) denotes the results
associated with nancial risky asset share. In each panel, the horizontal axis represents the
value we set for the threshold ratio that is used to divide the sample into two groups. The
vertical axis represents the dierence between 2 and 1. In particular, if i is not statistically
dierent from zero, we set it at zero. OLS1 denotes the dierences associated with our rst
OLS estimates in our tables. OLS2 denotes the dierences associated with our second OLS
estimates in our tables. All the results hold at the 10% signicant condence interval.
In summary, our hypothesis essentially implies that when habits are roughly constant,
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controlling the impact of household income and income shocks will help generate a positive
increase of  from the i = 1 group to the i = 2 group. Since our empirical results conrm such
a hypothesis, we argue, in terms of the testable theoretical prediction, that habit formation
preferences are supported by the PSID data.
5 Empirical Results about Semi-strong Form of HFPI
To test the prediction, Inequality (2.9), we estimate the following equation for both subsam-
ples:
kt = qt k + kht + kwt   #ytkwt + "t; (5.1)
Comparing to Eq. (10) in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), we introduce the term yt (wt)
in Eq. (5.1) in order to get the estimate of . The main reason is that it is not feasible to
directly test  > 0 because both  and y are constant and there is no way to isolate the
value of  directly. Since the additional term is the only dierence between Eq. (5.1) and Eq.
(10) in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), all econometric issues, such as measurement errors,
that have been addressed in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) are handled in the same way.
As in the case of the discussion about the weak form of HFPI, we use two dierent types of
household income in our empirical analysis of liquid risky asset shares. We use labor income
to denote household income in our empirical analysis of nancial risky asset shares.
The main results are in Table 2. In general, we nd no response of risky asset shares to
wealth uctuations. For example, the liquid risky asset share decreases with liquid wealth
in the 1984-1999 subsample and has no response in the 1999-2003 subsample. The nancial
risky asset share presents no response to nancial wealth in both subsamples. In contrast,
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) nd strong negative response of the nancial risky asset
share to the wealth uctuations. This comparison shows that controlling for income raises
the estimate of , conrming the implication of our theoretical model with constant household
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income that omitting household income bias downward the estimates of .
Furthermore, Wachter and Yogo (2010) argue that the response of risky asset share to
wealth uctuations should be positive and it is actually in line with the negative response
in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) once the impact of household income is considered. Our
results indicate that, even though the introduction of household income may, theoretically,
help explain the negative results found in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), the impact of
household income on the relationship is too weak to reconcile the opposite relationships.
That is to say, simple controlling the impact of household income alone is not enough to
turn the relationship from negative to positive.
In summary, without considering the impact of large negative income shocks, empirical
results are likely to reject the hypothesis, Inequality (2.9). This is because such estimates
are subject to the external mis-identication problem.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce time-varying household income, an empirically important ele-
ment, into a portfolio choice model with external habits. The key theoretical contribution
of our paper is that our analytical solution adds the following new results to the litera-
ture: (1) risky asset shares respond to wealth uctuations through two channels, habit and
household income; (2) households, depending on whether they experience large negative in-
come shocks or not, have opposite response through the habit channel; and (3) an internal
mis-identication problem arises if the two channels are considered as one channel while an
external mis-identication problem arises if the heterogeneous responses across households
are ignored.
Accordingly, we test the semi-strong form and the weak form of HFPI. Our empirical
contribution is that we nd positive evidence of the weak form of HFPI. Our positive evidence
of the weak form of HFPI is clear evidence of the empirical relevance of habit formation
preferences in the household level data. Our rened results provide condence with respect
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to the use of habit formation preferences in those macro models. Even though our results
reject the semi-strong form of HFPI, in line with the rejection of the strong form of HFPI
in the literature, our acceptance of the weak form shows the importance of controlling for
the internal and external mis-identication problems. In addition, our analysis bridges the
gap between the success of macro models with habits and the previous negative evidence in
micro data by using more realistic theoretical models to identify the estimation.
Questions still remain. First, the eect of inertia on portfolio adjustments remains un-
changed from those in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), which casts reasonable doubt on
the soundness of habit formation preferences. Thus, the strong asset allocation inertia iden-
tied in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) remains an interesting and not well-understood
phenomenon. Second, new data have been issued. It is of interest to check the robustness
with additional data and this is on our future research agenda.
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A Weak Form of HFPI
Table 1: Changes in Risky Asset Shares: Weak Form of HFPI
k = 5 (1984{1999)
OLS1 OLS2 TSLS
Dependent variable:
Proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds
Key independent variablea
k log liquid wealtht
Estimates for Dierent Cohorts
Bottom 30% -.304* -.268 -.185
The rest -.160 -.205 .694
Dependent variable:
Proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds
Key independent variableb
k log liquid wealtht
Estimates for Dierent Cohorts
Bottom 30% -.522** -.507** .478
The rest -.145 -.275* .721
Dependent variable:
Proportion of nancial wealth invested in stocks, mutual funds,
equity in a private business, and home equity
Key independent variablea
k log nancial wealtht
Estimates for Dierent Cohorts
Bottom 30% -.967** -.681* .312
The rest -0.244 -.374 .487
Dependent variable:
Proportion of nancial wealth (home equity not included) invested
in stocks, mutual funds, and equity in a private business
Key independent variable
k log nancial wealth (home equity not included)t
Estimates for Dierent Cohorts
Bottom 30% -1.000** -1.079** -1.105
The rest -.537 -.736 .157
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are used to judge the signicance of
estimates. ** denotes the estimate is statistically signicantly dierent from 0 at the 5% signicance level and
* denotes that the estimate is statistically dierent from 0 at the 10% signicance level. a means that the
included income is the labor income and b means the income is the household income. The control variables are
the same as those in Table 2. The dierence between the OLS1 and the OLS2 is that only OLS2 includes \Asset
composition controls" in the control variables. In particular, asset composition controls for the liquid asset share
include: the labor income/liquid wealth ratio interacted with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and
the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio. For the nancial asset share, asset composition controls consist only of
the labor income/nancial wealth ratio interacted with age.
kt = 
iqit k + kh
i
t + 
ikw
i
t   #yitk
 
wit

+ "it; i = 1; 2:
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B Semi-Strong Form of HFPI
Table 2: Changes in Risky Asset Shares
k = 5 (1984{1999) k = 2(1999{2003)
OLS1 OLS2 TSLS OLS1 OLS2 TSLS
Dependent variable:
Proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds
Explanatory variablesa:
k log liquid wealtht -.223** -.216 .178 .043 .007 -.283
(.114) (.121) (.586) (.108) (.109) (1.073)
Asset composition controls
p p
Preference shifters
p p p p p p
Life-cycle controls
p p p p p p
Year-region FE
p p p p p p
Adj. R2 .05 .05 { .05 .05 {
Overidentication test { { [.60] { { [.03]
N 1,184 1,184 1,189 1,348 1,348 1,436
Dependent variable:
Proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds
Explanatory variablesb:
k log liquid wealtht -.300** -.384** .441 .010 -.008 -.532
(.104) (.112) (.572) (.093) (.094) (1.013)
Asset composition controls
p p
Preference shifters
p p p p p p
Life-cycle controls
p p p p p p
Year-region FE
p p p p p p
Adj. R2 .05 .06 { .04 .05 {
Overidentication test { { [.67] { { [.04]
N 1,236 1,236 1,241 1,454 1,454 1,551
Dependent variable:
Proportion of nancial wealth invested in stocks, mutual funds,
equity in a private business, and home equity
Explanatory variablesa:
k log nancial wealtht -.514 -.465 .343 -.390 -.393 -.204
(.347) (.406) (.835) (.248) (.245) (1.556)
Asset composition controls
p p
Preference shifters
p p p p p p
Life-cycle controls
p p p p p p
Year-region FE
p p p p p p
Adj. R2 .13 .13 { .10 .10 {
Overidentication test { { [.45] { { [.05]
N 1,206 1,206 1,211 1,379 1,379 1,471
Notes: Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and p-values
in brackets. ** denotes the estimate is statistically signicantly dierent from 0 at the 5% signicance level
and * denotes that the estimate is statistically dierent from 0 at the 10% signicance level. a means that the
included income is the labor income and b means the income is the household income. The control variables are
the same as those in Table 2. The dierence between the OLS1 and the OLS2 is that only OLS2 includes \Asset
composition controls" in the control variables. In particular, asset composition controls for the liquid asset share
include: the labor income/liquid wealth ratio interacted with age, the business wealth/liquid wealth ratio, and
the housing wealth/liquid wealth ratio. For the nancial asset share, asset composition controls consist only of
the labor income/nancial wealth ratio interacted with age.
kt = qt k + kht + kwt   #ytk (wt) + "t:
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C Strong Form of HFPI: The Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2008) Results
Table 3: Changes in the Risky Asset Shares
k = 5 (1984{1999) k = 2(1999{2003)
OLS1 OLS2 TSLS OLS1 OLS2 TSLS
Dependent variable:
Proportion of liquid wealth invested in stocks and mutual funds
Explanatory variables:
k log liquid wealtht -.014* -.009 -.012 .023* .017 -.136
(.006) (.009) (.063) (.011) (.015) (.076)
Asset composition controls
p p
Preference shifters
p p p p p p
Life-cycle controls
p p p p p p
Year-region FE
p p p p p p
Adj. R2 .05 .05 { .01 .02 {
Overidentication test { { [.41] { { [.64]
N 1,236 1,236 1,236 1,455 1,455 1,455
Dependent variable:
Proportion of nancial wealth invested in stocks, mutual funds,
equity in a private business, and home equity
Explanatory variables:
k log nancial wealtht -.161* -.172 -.198* -.108* -.103* -.355*
(.059) (.091) (.090) (.031) (.036) (.130)
Asset composition controls
p p
Preference shifters
p p p p p p
Life-cycle controls
p p p p p p
Year-region FE
p p p p p p
Adj. R2 .16 .16 { .06 .06 {
Overidentication test { { [.56] { { [.57]
N 1,260 1,260 1,260 1,489 1,489 1,489
Notes: Table 3 replicates Tables 4 and 5 in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and p-values in brackets. * denotes the
estimate is statistically signicant dierent from 0 at 5% level.
kt = qt k + kht + kwt + "t:
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Figure 1: Sensitivity Analysis Results
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(a) Liquid Risky Asset Share: Threshold Ratio
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(b) Financial Risky Asset Share: Threshold Ratio
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Notes: The horizontal axis represents the value we set for the threshold ratio that is used to divide the sample into
two groups. The vertical axis represents the dierence between 2 and 1. In particular, if i is not statistically
dierent from zero, we set it at zero. OLS1 denotes the dierences associated with our rst OLS estimates in our
tables. OLS2 denotes the dierences associated with our second OLS estimates in our tables. All the results hold at
the 10% signicant condence interval. Panel (a) denotes the results associated with liquid risky asset share. Panel
(b) denotes the results associated with nancial risky asset share. And Panel (c) denotes the results associated with
nancial risky asset share without home equity.
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